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employed to keep rates of teenage childbearing low.
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een pregnancy is back in the news. After 15 
years of decline, the trend in teen birth rates 
ticked upward in 2006. Coupled with the 
ongoing media spotlight on the popular film 
Juno and the pregnancy of Britney Spears’ 
younger sister, we’re once again wringing 
our collective hands over kids having kids. 
But are these concerns really warranted? To 
what extent does teen pregnancy lead to mothers’ and children’s 
long-term poverty? Have policies adopted to deter early 
childbearing been effective in discouraging teens from having 
children before they are ready to shoulder the responsibilities 
of parenthood? To answer these questions, it’s necessary to put 
the issue in proper historical context, and to cast a sober eye on 
existing policies that were employed to keep rates of teenage 
childbearing low.
Teenage childbearing first emerged as a public issue in the 
mid-1960s in the wake of the baby boom era. After the median 
marriage age for women dipped to 20 years in the late 1950s, 
the trend reversed, and Americans began marrying later and 
later. By 2006, the median age at marriage had risen to nearly 
26 years. The rise in median age was occasioned in part by 
the decline of well-paying manufacturing and union jobs that 
undercut the time-honored practice of “shotgun weddings.” 
No longer were pregnant teens prepared to marry the fathers 
of their children when the men lacked good jobs or prospects 
of getting them in the immediate future. These weddings 
were partly responsible for the low median marriage age in 
the United States in the middle of the previous century. Today, 
shotgun weddings have become archaic; rather few teenage 
or even older couples now wed merely because of a premarital 
pregnancy.
While early marriage became less practical and desirable, 
sexual activity during the teen years continued, and younger 
women in the 1960s and 1970s practiced contraception 
poorly (if at all). The inevitable result of the decline in teenage 
marriage was a rising proportion of out-of-wedlock births among 
teenagers, especially among low-income minorities, even 
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Trends
Figure 1. Birthrates among Unmarried American Women by Race and Age, 1970 to 2004
Source: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (2000); author’s compilation of national vital statistics data from 2000 to 2004.
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though the rate of non-marital births (per 1,000 unmarried 
women, ages 15–19) has fluctuated but not increased over the 
past several decades. (See Figure 1.) Driving the attention, 
then, was not an increase in the propensity of teens to become 
pregnant but a much lower likelihood of marriage when they 
did. Nonetheless, by the 1970s, teenage childbearing was 
declared by reproductive health advocates as an “epidemic” and 
by critics of more permissive sexual standards as a crisis for the 
American family.
In the clarity of hindsight, teenagers were merely the leading 
edge of a significant change in family formation—the decline 
of marriage and the rise of non-marital fertility in the United 
States and throughout much of the Western world, as Figure 
1 shows. Over time, the trend first most conspicuous among 
black teens became increasingly prevalent among white teens 
and then among all women in their 20s and even 30s. Recent 
decades have seen declines in non-marital childbearing among 
blacks, especially black teenagers, while rates for white women 
have risen. 
Nearly all observers, myself included, initially saw this trend 
in non-marital childbearing among teenagers as ominous. 
Across the political spectrum, social scientists and policymakers 
claimed on the basis of existing evidence that early childbearing 
contributed substantially to creating and sustaining long-term 
poverty and social disadvantage. Having a baby before social 
maturity, many early reports claimed, greatly increased the odds 
of dropping out of school and entering low-wage work or public 
assistance. In growing numbers, policy experts began to argue 
that reducing teenage childbearing was a powerful strategy for 
curtailing the cycle of social disadvantage. Sharp disputes have 
also emerged across the political spectrum over proper preven-
tion strategies, and I’ll return to these differences later. But first 
I want to question the evidence underlying the conventional 
wisdom that childbearing early in life destines young women, 
their partners, and children for a life of disadvantage.
While it would be inaccurate to declare the conventional 
wisdom wholly wrong, a growing body of research indicates 
that it is surely exaggerated and increasingly disconnected from 
the policies that have been devised to curb early childbearing. 
Although teenage childbearing may contribute modestly to 
economic and social disadvantage, it is certainly not the, or even 
a, major cause of poverty for teenage mothers or their children. 
On the contrary, the main causal pathway likely works in the 
opposite direction: That is, persistent poverty is one of the pri-
mary causes of this nation’s high levels of teenage childbearing.
The Baltimore Study
Some 40 years ago, I began following the lives of several hun-
dred teen mothers in Baltimore. The participants were mostly 
black, poor or near poor, and under 18 when they became 
pregnant. They all delivered their babies at a single hospital that 
drew from a broad catchment area including but not restricted 
to inner-city neighborhoods. As far as I could discern, their 
demographic characteristics closely matched the larger popu-
lation of teen mothers in the city and generally fit the profile 
of teen mothers living in other metropolitan areas. Over the 
decades, the women were interviewed seven times and, in the 
later stages of the study, I conducted in-depth conversations 
with a subsample of the participants.
Predictably, in the early stages of the study, many of the 
women floundered. Many failed to graduate from high school in 
the early years of the study. Most had trouble gaining a foothold 
in the labor market, and nearly two-thirds had spells of relying 
on public assistance. Although a majority married in the first 
five years following the childbirth, usually to the fathers of their 
children, most of the marriages failed to survive. Only one in 
five of those who wed their children’s fathers remained married 
throughout the first-born’s childhood, and marriages contracted 
with non-fathers were even less stable. Despite their stated 
intentions and desires, most of the women had another child 
within two or three years of their first birth. Compared with 
their classmates, the women were experiencing distinctly more 
social and economic problems. So the profile of teen mothers 
derived from the early interviews gave every indication that 
most women and children were headed for a life of long-term 
disadvantage.
It was a something of a shock, then, to discover that this 
projection turned out to be largely inaccurate. Later interviews 
from the Baltimore study revealed that most of the teen mothers 
made substantial strides in their adult years (see Figure 2). Many 
returned to school either to graduate or earn a GED, and by their 
40s, 10 percent had graduated from college. Most curtailed their 
fertility after a second or third birth. Over half became sterilized 
in their mid and late 20s, sometimes despite considerable oppo-
sition from the medical profession. Stable marriages continued 
to be elusive, but as single mothers, most of the women became 
self-supporting. Less than a sixth of the pool of women became 
chronic welfare recipients, and most of those who did suffered 
from serious cognitive, educational, physical or mental deficits, 
many of which predated the birth of their first child. Compared 
with a national sample of women with similar demographic and 
family characteristics, the teen mothers in Baltimore were only 
modestly worse off in later life than their counterparts who had 
begun childbearing after their teen years.
As for their first-born children, the picture is somewhat less 
clear. This much I can say: Slightly more than a third of the 
daughters became teenage mothers. Most of these daughters 
were faring surprisingly well by their late 20s. Compared with 
the daughters, the first-born sons were displaying many more 
problems in early adulthood. Close to half of the sons had 
dropped out of high school, and many had spent time in prison. 
What is more difficult to judge from this study and others like it 
is whether their mother’s age when they were born contributes 
at all to these struggles.
The results of my study are far from unique. The few other 
long-term longitudinal studies that exist reveal similar trajecto-
ries of recovery among teen mothers. All point to a high level of 
resiliency among early childbearers and, at least, their female 
offspring. This research seems to suggest that, while the short-
term impact of childbearing can be highly disruptive to the lives 
of some women, teenage motherhood is not nearly as potent a 
source of disadvantage as many policy makers have believed. 
Apart from the remarkable determination of many teen moth-
ers to get back on track, there is another reason some of the 
early studies on the consequences of teenage childbearing were 
misleading. They simply did not take adequate measure of the 
“selective recruitment” of unplanned parenthood—the distinc-
tive characteristics of teenagers who have sex early in life, fail to 
use contraception reliably, and bring pregnancies to term. Prior 
to becoming pregnant, such teenagers are likely to have poor 
school performance, mental health problems, and the like.
Over the past decade and a half, economists, demographers, 
and sociologists have had a field day trying to measure the 
impact of early childbearing after taking account of selection. 
Disagreement remains in the literature on the precise magni-
tude of the impact, but almost everyone agrees that the size of 
the effect of the timing of first birth falls somewhere between 
minimal and modest depending on which outcome is exam-
ined. To put it differently, if young women from poor, minority 
communities delay their first birth by five years on average, it 
would do relatively little to change their economic fortunes in 
later life or to improve their chances of entering and maintain-
ing a stable union. This is not to say that reducing teenage 
childbearing is not a worthy enterprise. Relatively few teens 
plan to become pregnant or are happy when conception occurs, 
but it turns out that reducing teenage childbearing is a rela-
tively blunt instrument for improving the economic or family 
fortunes of the disadvantaged.
Teenage Childbearing and Public Policy
In my recent book on this topic, I trace three lines of public pol-
icy that were predicated on the assumption that early childbear-
ing was strongly implicated in the intergenerational transmis-
sion of social disadvantage: welfare reform, marriage promotion, 
and abstinence promotion. Welfare reform was in part justified 
as an approach to removing the “incentives” for early childbear-
ing. Charles Murray, among many others, argued that the wel-
fare system encouraged early and out-of-wedlock childbearing. 
Some proponents of welfare reform have pointed to the decline 
in teenage childbearing, especially among black women, as 
evidence of its success. However, the decline in early childbear-
ing began fully five years before Temporary Assistance for Needy 
Families was passed (much less implemented). Evidence from 
state-level comparisons designed to reveal the impact of rules 
and restrictions on teen childbearing and out-of-wedlock parent-
hood either show no effects or very modest impacts. Qualitative 
data from my study and others that included interviews with 
young parents reinforce the impression that public assistance 
did not provide incentives for childbearing. What two research-
ers referred to years ago as “the myth of the brood sow” was, 
in fact, a fictitious account of why teenagers and poor women 
more generally have children out of wedlock.
Trends
Figure 2. Characteristics of Teenage Mothers, 1972 to 1995–96 Across Time, Weighted for Attrition (N = 197)
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Marriage promotion, a central policy of the current admin-
istration, seems unlikely to be very effective. The policy is 
predicated on the assumption that persuading couples to marry 
will improve their own prospects and the well-being of their 
children. Nothing from my study or the work of others who 
have tried to measure the impact of birth timing on marriage 
prospects seems to support this notion. The women who mar-
ried and remained in stable unions—a very small percentage of 
all those who ever wed—certainly did better than those who did 
not, but that result occurred largely because they and their part-
ners had more resources and commitment from the start. And, 
as I mentioned earlier, even among those who wed their child’s 
father, only one marriage in five survived until the child was 18. 
Indeed, the likely breakup of these unions only created further 
flux in the family lives of the women and children. 
I would not place high hopes on this nation’s ability to coun-
sel unwed couples with children sufficiently well to achieve sta-
ble and lasting marriages. At the margins, counseling couples 
may help, but it is difficult to imagine that such programs will 
be intense and long-lasting enough to make a sizable difference 
in the high rate of union dissolution. There are some ongoing 
experiments of programs designed to do just that, and we would 
be wise to await their results before pronouncing marriage pro-
motion as a failure. However, I would be extremely surprised, 
pleasantly so, if this policy turns out to be an effective recipe for 
creating stable families and thereby reducing poverty.
A third direction of public policy has been to discourage 
early childbearing by promoting sexual abstinence during the 
teen years. Based on the premise that there is no effective way 
of preventing early childbearing except by getting teens to defer 
sexual activity, this approach has been one of the hallmarks of 
the conservative movement. Looking at all of the available infor-
mation, it is probably not too soon to conclude that abstinence 
promotion is both retrogressive and a dismal failure. 
According to data collected by the Guttmacher Institute, 
there has been a decline over the past decade in school-based 
sex education programs that explicitly discuss contraception. 
It appears that we have actually been back-peddling in provid-
ing preventive and reproductive health services to adolescents 
because many conservatives believe these services encourage 
promiscuity. However, virtually all the random-assignment 
evaluations of programs aimed at promoting abstinence have 
shown that they are unsuccessful in getting teens to postpone 
sexual activity. This finding is consistent with national data col-
lected by the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) indicating that 
patterns of sexual activity have remained relatively stable during 
the past decade even as federal and state governments promoted 
the virtues of sexual abstinence. There has been a slight drop 
in the number of teens who have ever had intercourse, but the 
number of those who have had intercourse in the past three 
months remains unchanged. Moreover, a substantial number 
of teens continue to engage in unprotected sex. Recent data 
released by CDC indicates that about a quarter of teenage girls 
who have ever had sex have an STD. 
Our benighted approach to prevention—advocating absti-
nence while limiting exposure to contraceptive education—may 
also be implicated in the recent uptick in teenage childbearing. 
For the first time in 15 years, rates of teenage childbearing rose, 
and the increase was substantial, occurring among all ethnic 
groups. We cannot know for sure that the policies of the current 
administration explain this change or even that it is the begin-
ning of a reversal of the long-standing decline in the rate of 
early childbearing. Nonetheless, we can conclude, I believe, that 
“abstinence only” has not worked to deter sexual activity, STDs, 
pregnancies, or childbearing. Whatever one believes about the 
costs of early childbearing or its link to long-term poverty and 
family instability, “abstinence only” programs have been a policy 
disaster.
None of the three approaches to pregnancy prevention 
among teens mentioned above appears to be a successful 
strategy for reducing either teenage childbearing or poverty. The 
apparent “causal” link between early childbearing and long-term 
poverty is questionable. If anything, the link probably mostly 
operates in the reverse direction: Persistent poverty may foster 
conditions that elevate higher levels of unintended childbearing, 
especially among teenagers.
If we want to work on reducing teen childbearing—and I 
think we do—we should adopt a more realistic approach to 
preparing teens to make wiser decisions if and when they do 
enter sexual relationships. This is far from impossible. Most 
other countries in advanced economies treat this decision less 
as a moral dilemma than a public health problem. They actively 
promote safe sex through condoms and advocate reducing 
unwanted pregnancies by educating the young to use contracep-
tion and by making services readily available. Their levels of 
sexual activity among teens are no higher than the levels in the 
United States and, generally, they have lower rates of unin-
tended pregnancies and abortions.
Strengthening reproductive health services for teens will 
help curtail the level of unintended pregnancy among young, 
unmarried women, but it will not help much to improve their 
fortunes in later life unless they are able to put the delay in par-
enthood to their advantage. This means that we must craft more 
effective policies at keeping youth in school, improving their 
educational attainment, and increasing the payoff of employ-
ment when they enter the workplace. Then, and only then, will 
we begin to see a connection between postponement of parent-
hood and the reduction of poverty.  ■
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